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BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY? THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF 
HEALTHCARE IN THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM AND BRAZIL 
That healthcare reform involves a myriad of policy choices and complex trade-offs is, 
of course, a trite observation.  The dilemmas that arise from trying to solve one 
important and challenging problem - bringing down the cost of healthcare whilst 
simultaneously improving the care offered - are all too familiar.  We are accustomed 
to considering those dilemmas, and resultant trade-offs, in terms of expenditure, 
technological advances, fundholding, access, choice, coverage, efficiency, quality and 
so on, but other trade-offs occur which are not so well documented or discussed.  
These are the accommodations and compromises made at the constitutional level as 
a result of healthcare reform, and they raise important issues of constitutional identity 
and fidelity.   
From decisions about constitutions and healthcare emerge systems which, 
ideally, form interlocking shapes, lending coherence, legitimacy and fit both to a 
jurisdiction’s healthcare policy and its constitution, which is the setting in which that 
policy must operate.  As will be demonstrated, however, form and fit do not necessarily 
achieve this ideal symbiosis.  Through an examination of three distinct approaches to 
healthcare reform in three different constitutional contexts – namely those of the 
United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and Brazil – we reveal the 
ease with which a constitution may be undercut to achieve a particular policy aim.  This 
outcome is at odds with the expectations liberal democracy attaches to a constitution 
and its role in ordering society but indicates that constitutional fidelity commonly yields 
to hard policy choices, and not just in America.   
1. The Relative Importance of ‘Form’, ‘Fit’ and Healthcare 
The jurisdictions examined here exhibit formal variety in healthcare and constitution 
but our interest is in ‘fit’ rather than what we consider the sideshow of ‘form’.  As 
Bogdanor has noted, “[w]hether a country has a codified constitution is hardly 
something of great importance ... Whether it achieves the aims which constitutions are 
intended to help achieve, is a matter of far greater moment.”1  The same might be said 
for healthcare systems.  To demonstrate the point, both Brazil and the USA have 
codified constitutions, whilst the UK’s constitution is uncodified, yet Brazil and the UK 
maintain public healthcare systems whilst the USA traditionally favoured a privately 
funded model.  Little can be drawn from that and, although we need briefly to address 
form, we will move quickly to examine how each jurisdiction has attempted to ensure 
that healthcare is constitutionally accommodated irrespective of form.  Evaluating the 
jurisdictions’ approaches to fit is much more revealing since, for policymakers, judges, 
or both, confronting the issue is laborious and strained as it requires the examination 
and balancing of a jurisdiction’s constitutional history, philosophy and evolution – the 
components of fit2 - with potentially progressive innovations in healthcare policy.   
The difficulties engendered by attempting to map healthcare policy to 
constitution may lead to the issue of fit being bypassed, avoided or overlooked.  
Specifically in the UK and the USA, where no express right to healthcare exists, 
seeking equilibrium between free market autonomy and state-sponsored support in 
healthcare has generated these kinds of difficulties.  The two jurisdictions’ reforms 
manifest an ideological shift from opposite ends of the healthcare spectrum towards 
the same point – the co-existence of public and private in a single system - but 
consideration for that kind of scheme’s fit with the constitution has been deficient or 
absent.  Brazil, meanwhile, created an express, expansive sweep of a constitutional 
right to health whose practical realisation has been partial and problematic.  In these 
deficient attempts to reconcile healthcare and constitution, three distinct approaches 
may be discerned: constitutional routing in the USA, procedural protection in the UK 
and substantive protection in Brazil.  Yet in each jurisdiction a gap emerges between 
what is promised and what is delivered by the constitution, meaning that constitutional 
fidelity has been a subsidiary concern to the necessity of healthcare reform.    
Arguably, such gaps might emerge in any given policy context but healthcare 
presents a particular challenge.  Firstly, it bears enormous symbolic value.3  In each 
jurisdiction examined here, the promise of a peerless, universal healthcare system has 
loomed large in the political marketplace of ideas.  Secondly, pressing practical 
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considerations have begun to bite, principally the economic liability created by a failing 
healthcare system.  In 2010, healthcare accounted for 17.6% of GDP in the USA, 9.6% 
in the UK and 9.0% in Brazil.  The USA spent $8,233 per capita, the United Kingdom 
$3,433 and Brazil $1,028.4  The average cost of healthcare is rising, as are unusual 
costs and costs related to advances in diagnostics and treatment.5  Demography is 
also an economic driver as the healthcare needs of a growing, ageing population exert 
additional demands on resources.  Failure to offer a workable solution to healthcare 
could, therefore, unsettle whole economies at both national and international levels.  
Indeed, it has been observed that, unless spending on healthcare is checked and 
managed, by 2015 the sovereign creditworthiness of G20 countries could be harmed.6  
The stakes are clearly high and, to that extent, perhaps invite policymakers to neglect 
the potential constitutional ramifications of reform, even where, in avoiding an 
unsettled economy, the alternative is to unsettle the constitution. 
2. USA: Constitutional Routing 
The Supreme Court (SC) has played an important role in ensuring that the USA’s 
eighteenth century constitution, whilst difficult to amend through its own Article V 
procedures, remains relevant, applicable and fit for the modern world.  The 
Constitution serves the principal purpose of dividing the powers of government, rather 
than expressing a commitment to rights.7  The Bill of Rights offers individuals 
protection from government interference with certain, primarily political, freedoms but 
features only negative rights (that cannot be denied to a person), rather than positive 
rights (that must be afforded to a person).  Given its nature and principal purpose, it is 
not, therefore, surprising that the Constitution is silent on a right to healthcare: it is 
neither political nor negative and, as such, would not ‘fit’ the model.  Nevertheless, 
healthcare, amongst other policy issues, has found its way into the canon of 
constitutional law.  We are not concerned, here, with the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) 
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constitutionality but rather how NFIB joins a long list of precedents in which 
constitutionality rests upon something other than the Constitution’s text, namely the 
SC’s interpretation of what that text now means.8   
To the extent that a constitution is neither an empty vessel nor a tablet of stone 
it is to be expected that, in adjudicating change, the SC creates a gap between the 
Constitution as written and as interpreted.  Interpretation is, however, a matter of 
degree: too rigid an adherence to the text may thwart progress, too permissive an 
approach may vitiate the constitution.  Aiming for fit, we argue, engenders considered 
interpretation which leads to minimal gapping between the written and interpreted 
constitution.  What is noteworthy about NFIB is that, in paying scant attention to fit, the 
SC considerably widened that gap by routing the ACA’s constitutionality through 
Article I’s federal tax power.   
The ACA’s individual mandate had been identified as being ‘enabled’ by no 
fewer than three of the Constitution’s clauses.  Firstly, the President and Democrat-
controlled Congress rooted the individual mandate in the Commerce Clause.9  
Secondly, the federal government argued that, even if the Court interpreted the 
Commerce Clause narrowly, so as to deny authorisation for the individual mandate, it 
would be authorised by the Necessary and Proper Clause.10  Finally, Chief Justice 
Roberts identified Congress’s power to tax as the proper source of legislative authority.  
Prior to NFIB, the main vehicle for constitutional routing had been the 
Commerce Clause11 but, in NFIB, no majority manifested to approve the legitimacy of 
routing mandatory federal health insurance through that clause.  Instead, Chief Justice 
Roberts affirmed Congress’s power to mandate individuals to purchase healthcare 
insurance through the Taxing and Spending Clause, maintaining that “the mandate is 
not a legal command to buy insurance.  Rather it makes going without insurance just 
another thing the Government taxes, like buying gasoline or earning income.”12  The 
Taxing and Spending clause has, of course, long been deemed to provide a foundation 
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for welfare and healthcare legislation13 but not where the ‘tax’ concerned is, in reality, 
not a tax but a penalty for failure to enter the healthcare insurance market and where 
questions remain over further of its Article I credentials.14  NFIB thus supplies 
Congress with a supplementary grounding for collective action problems needing 
federalisation - the tax power, broadly construed.  This vastly expands the practice of, 
and possibilities for, constitutional routing by extending Congress's options in respect 
of the clauses to which it can bind a new policy, creating fresh rights in the process.  
As Justice Stone once quipped, the tax power is “sufficient for everything you want 
and need.”15  Indeed, in Barnett’s opinion, the upshot of NFIB is that Congress will “be 
able to penalize or mandate any activity by anyone in the country, provided it limited 
the sanction to a fine enforced by the Internal Revenue Service.”16   On this view, the 
Chief Justice’s decision to hold the individual mandate constitutional via the tax power 
is a highly controversial departure.  From the New Deal onwards, federal government 
has principally sought to establish the constitutionality of its actions through the 
Commerce Clause to the extent that the SC’s decisions regarding the Clause’s 
boundaries and outer limits have dominated federalism over the past twenty years.  
The power to tax may instead assume that role.        
Whilst constitutional routing assists the SC and Congress in avoiding the 
Constitution’s formal amendment procedures,17 it also enables the ducking of 
substantive constitutional debate, creates second-class rights and rights protection, 
forces rights into the constitutional structure without proper consideration of their fit 
and, in this case, upsets the proper state-federal balance of power.18  Through routing, 
the SC has granted federal government an enhanced role in managing the country’s 
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economy, protecting workers rights,19 and preventing discrimination.20  Not once has 
a power so assumed by federal government been repatriated to state governments.21  
Routing may be considered to protect rights because it prevents states from 
undertaking experimental action within a policy area by affording federal government 
the power to create a uniform national law but this frustrates one of federalism’s “happy 
incidents”, namely that “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country.”22   Constitutional routing prevents state experimentation by reserving 
policy making to the federal government.23  State governments can no longer engage 
in a ‘race to the bottom’, when one state offers economic actors a more favourable set 
of laws, so that other states are forced to follow suit or suffer the economic 
consequences.  Constitutionally routing protection of a policy to federal government 
may therefore place it beyond the kind of experimentation seen as a desirable by-
product of the constitutional set-up.  That the protection afforded by 
constitutionalisation comes not through a substantive safeguard but as a consequence 
of the SC’s reinterpretation of the constitution’s division of powers must beg questions 
about the sustainability of the federal model established by the Constitution.  
  By routing protection through Congress’s tax power the SC deemed 
constitutional federal legislation conferring an entitlement, standard, or regulatory 
benefit on the people.  This tilts the constitutional structure, bypassing the states and 
granting individuals a right against deviation by state governments from the federal 
framework and standard, as approved by the SC.24  Consequently, federal 
government becomes the principal provider of second and third generation rights: 
states are constitutionally disabled since they cannot undercut the level of protection 
offered, granted or gained in that area of governance where their competence has just 
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been substituted by that of federal government.25  The role of state governments in 
healthcare is thus confined to ensuring that federal standards are met.26  If, however, 
federal policymakers decide to change tack or experiment, nothing may stop them.   
The identification of a source of power for the regulation of healthcare gives 
national policymakers the freedom to decide which healthcare system should operate.  
Under NFIB’s ruling, therefore, federal government has been constitutionally enabled 
to diminish or enlarge the scope of protection for healthcare, as expressed in policy 
rather than the constitution, as it wishes.  Moreover, by creating structurally enforced 
rights, real debate concerning constitutional amendment and social welfare 
stagnates.27  Additionally, once undertaken, constitutional routing preserves the 
façade of the SC ostensibly remaining outside the politics of healthcare and respecting 
the Constitution’s separation of powers: 
 
“We do not consider whether the Act embodies sound policies. That judgment 
is entrusted to the Nation’s elected leaders. We ask only whether Congress has 
the power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions … Resolv-
ing this controversy requires us to examine both the limits of the Government’s 
power, and our own limited role in policing those boundaries.”28   
 
There are, of course, benefits to routing constitutional rights, not least the avoidance 
of the Constitution’s stringent Article V amendment procedure.  Instead, the 
Constitution’s substance is altered by the SC through definitional changes to power-
allocating structural clauses.  This ‘fluidity’ facilitates constitutional change but leaves 
behind a false perception of a stable constitution and deferential Court29 whilst also 
embodying the idea that the constitution must be “living, adapting, and changing and, 
simultaneously, invincibly stable and impervious to human manipulation.”30   
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It is also essential to note the quality of the right granted through routing.  NFIB affords 
no substantive constitutional protection to healthcare.31  It does not bestow a ‘right’ to 
healthcare upon any citizen.  In accordance with the black letter of the constitution, 
therefore, healthcare remains outside the scope of constitutional law.  After NFIB, it is 
not the ACA’s healthcare policy that is protected but the vehicle upon which it hitched 
its ride, namely the Article I tax power employed by federal government to undertake 
the reforms.  Since the New Deal, SC decisions interpreting congressional claims to 
power have led to the creation of a weak form of rights protection which has ultimately 
curtailed the need, or indeed desire, for formal constitutional amendment.32  Therefore, 
while the SC instigates constitutional routing to overcome rigid procedures of 
constitutional amendment, concomitantly it perpetuates the problem by remedying, on 
the hoof, the constitution’s chief weakness - its inflexibility.33  Constitutional routing 
masks the Constitution’s often unattainable thresholds for amendment.  ‘Rights’ 
created in this way may, however, be argued to be second-class rights.  They do not 
bear the same hallmarks of legitimacy or visibility as rights created via constitutional 
amendment, are parasitic and, being creatures of SC rather than legislative majorities, 
offer a dilute level of protection.     
Routing does not solve this predicament and is not the ideal form of rights 
protection since it evades the question of ‘fit’: the protection amounts to no more than 
federal government policy which, in the context of US constitutional history and 
philosophy, might be deemed ‘anti-fit’.  Routing provides federal safeguards against 
the states and leaves individuals with the guarantee of a uniform set of expectations.  
It may thus be argued to create federal ‘rights’.34   Issues persist, however, in terms of 
what is acceptable in aiming for ‘fit’.  Firstly, to the extent that the SC makes recourse 
to routing, it might be asked whether the Constitution’s formal amendment procedures 
are perhaps too restrictive?  Secondly, a difficulty arises where constitutional routing, 
despite some apparent benefits, permits rights to be created, and powers expanded, 
where the high barrier set for formal constitutional amendment cannot be reached.  
Thirdly, routing may encourage the exploitation of the constitution by politicians and 
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judges putting policy aims before constitutional adherence and, in that sense, create 
a constitution that is arguably based as much in the political process as the constitution 
of the UK.  
3. UK: Procedural Protection  
Conflict between healthcare reform and constitutional fit is also evident in the UK 
where the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA) came under considerable scrutiny 
during its passage through Parliament, notably in the upper legislative chamber, the 
House of Lords.  The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (HLSCC) 
raised a number of concerns about the effect the HSCA would have on the relationship 
between the government-operated National Health Service (NHS) and Parliament.  
The Committee’s report questioned whether the HSCA conformed to established 
methods of accountability in the UK’s uncodified constitution.35  That concern was, we 
argue, symptomatic of the fact that, in passing the HSCA, constitutional actors in the 
UK demonstrated as little regard for fit when faced with the problem of healthcare 
reform as their American counterparts. 
Parliamentary sovereignty is the grundnorm36 of the UK constitution.  It 
expresses the idea that Parliament may make or unmake any law and may not be 
bound in its actions by any previous Parliament.37  As a result of Parliament’s 
omnipotence, to all intents and purposes the constitution has no special ‘higher law’ 
status.38  In fulfilling its procedural role of assessing and scrutinising the proposed 
legislation, the HLSCC reviewed the HSCA to ensure that the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty was not inadvertently undercut by the reforms contained in the Act.39  The 
Committee found that the Act made substantive changes to the scope of the 
government’s responsibility for healthcare, without giving due regard to the 
constitutional ramifications of reform.40   
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Central to the HLSCC’s concern was that the HSCA would weaken the 
constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility which ensures that government 
ministers are accountable for their decisions and remain subservient to Parliament.41  
Intrinsic to this convention is the idea that a minister is responsible for what happens 
in her department, and that Parliament acts as a watchdog of ministerial behaviour.42  
The convention of ministerial responsibility aims to ensure that the executive is 
accountable to Parliament for its actions.43  To ensure that parliamentary sovereignty 
is upheld, a Minister must maintain Parliament’s confidence by explaining and 
justifying her decisions in the deployment of powers delegated to her.  The doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility is important because, apart from judicial review (where courts 
remain ostensibly subservient to Parliament by scrutinising only the executive’s 
implementation of parliamentary law), it is one of the only mechanisms or procedures 
through which members of the executive may be required to answer for their 
conduct.44  If the chain of responsibility is broken between a minister and Parliament, 
inhibitions on executive action are considerably weakened, Parliament’s sovereignty 
is undercut and the constitution loses democratic legitimacy because categories of 
government business fall outside its control.  In its report on the HSCA, therefore, the 
HLSCC was concerned to ensure that the appropriate link was maintained between 
the actions of the executive and Parliament.45  If parts of HSCA were exempted from 
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, that would signify a yielding of constitutional 
principle to the practical desire for healthcare reform, providing a poor fit with the UK’s 
traditional constitutional model where parliamentary sovereignty is the primary, not 
secondary, concern.   
The accountability gap identified developed through amendments to the 
National Health Services Act 2006 (NHSA). The Committee believed that the 
minister’s responsibility under the new Act would be considerably diluted46 and that 
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Parliament had, thus far, failed to consider this consequence.47  The Committee 
pointed out a subtle, yet highly significant, modification in the duty owed by the 
Secretary of State for Health to the NHS between the NHSA and HSCA.  The former 
imposed a duty on the Secretary of State to “provide or secure the provision of services 
in accordance with this Act”48, while the latter simply requires that the Secretary of 
State uses his powers “so as to secure that services are provided in accordance with 
this Act.”49  It was the HLSCC’s view that, this change meant “the chain of 
constitutional responsibility (between the NHS and Parliament) is severed.”50  The 
difference was clear: under the NHSA a positive duty existed to provide or secure 
services, whereas the HSCA merely requires the Secretary of State to secure those 
services.  The obligation to provide services was absent from the new legislation 
meaning that provision could occur in the private, rather than public, sphere.  
Removing this positive obligation from the Secretary of State meant that there would 
no longer be a governmental duty to offer certain treatments if they could not be 
sourced from the free market.  If the Secretary of State was unable to secure a service 
from a provider, there would be no obligation then to provide that service.  
The scope of the Secretary of State’s responsibility to Parliament would be 
reduced under the new law because a large part of the NHS would now be placed 
beyond her control, resulting in much of the functioning and performance of the NHS 
lacking any form of accountability.51  Moreover, it was unclear who would be 
accountable for the NHS services provided, if not the Secretary of State.  No longer 
would Members of Parliament be able to ask questions of the Secretary of State 
regarding the government’s failure to provide constituents with healthcare.  Their remit 
would be limited to inquiring about the services the government had secured or could 
secure.52 Furthermore, the NHS does not possess the governance structures 
associated with private market accountability, such as shareholders and stakeholders.  
In this light, it can be seen that the desire to reform the NHS caused potential questions 
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of constitutional fit to be ignored and the practical need for change put first.  That had 
two major constitutional impacts.  First, the removal of the Secretary of State’s 
responsibility upset the pertaining constitutional balance.  King has identified this as 
part of a trend which is “subverting the traditional constitution.”53  When responsibility 
is removed from the Minister the traditionally “clear-cut line of authority becomes a 
scramble”54, with accountability becoming lost amongst the private sector, quangos55 
and civil servants.  Second, the impetus to achieve the desired reforms to healthcare 
blinded the government to the poor fit within the UK’s constitutional framework of the 
market’s new regulatory structure 
In response to the HLSCC’s highlighting of the possible dilution in ministerial 
responsibility, the government inserted the following into the HSCA: 
 
“The Secretary of State retains ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the 
provision of the health service in England.”56 
 
This provision aims to reassure and confirm that the Secretary of State remains 
responsible to Parliament for her department’s operation. Nevertheless, the 
substantive, statutory duty of the Secretary of State remains merely to secure rather 
than provide services.  The HLSCC was unsuccessful in altering this.  Whether or not 
a future court will read the word provide into secure as a result of the provision remains 
to be seen but, given the courts’ deferential posture, this seems unlikely.  
When evaluated against other constitutions, the UK’s overarching commitment 
to parliamentary sovereignty could appear retrogressive, not least because it leaves 
control over the constitution in the hands of the political class.  Nicol identifies a silver 
lining, however, in claiming that parliamentary sovereignty makes the UK constitution 
ideologically neutral57 by not crystallising and embedding specific ideological beliefs.  
Democracy is maintained through the constitution’s direct link to swings in political 
opinion.  As we will soon see, this is in complete contrast to the Brazilian constitution.  
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Through leaving the task of definition to politics, the UK constitution does not mandate 
pre-emptive and substantive policy choices.  Nor does it force politicians, judges and 
academics to work around any entrenched provisions in order to accommodate policy 
reform as does the constitution of the USA.  Parliamentary sovereignty means that no 
political alternative, policy idea, or economic decision, is ever pre-ordained, barred, or 
outside the realm of possibility.  This does not mean, however, that ‘fit’ with the 
constitution is a given for the policy choices of politicians: it is neutral, not empty.  
The procedural mechanisms within a parliamentary democracy’s constitution 
must be adhered to for that constitution to maintain its legitimacy.  The HSCA’s 
modification of statutory language created an accountability gap between the new 
NHS governance model and the constitution.  In striving for a more flexible NHS, with 
free market sensibilities, government placed adherence to constitutional principles 
second.  This means that, in the UK, the desire to find a workable solution to healthcare 
reform has led to a gap between accepted constitutional principles and the practical 
desire for a workable healthcare system.  While the nature of this gap differs from 
those in the USA and Brazil, it is clear evidence of an emerging theme, namely that 
healthcare reform may require policy makers to overlook ordinary principles of 
constitutionalism to overcome the problems healthcare reform poses.  Brazil is our 
final case in point.     
4. Brazil: Substantive Protection 
The drafting and ratification of Brazil’s 1988 constitution occurred almost immediately 
after two decades of military dictatorship and was a highly transparent and inclusive 
process.  As such it recognisably represents a progressive advancement of 
democratic and liberal ideals, bearing the title ‘Citizen Constitution’ (Constituição 
Cidadã).  Its 245 articles, authored out of broad participation and compromise, cover 
nearly every aspect of daily life, protecting not only an array of first generation rights 
but also second and third generation rights.  A right to health is explicitly guaranteed 
under Article 6.58  It is not merely healthcare to which the Brazilian citizen is entitled, 
therefore, but an altogether broader right to ‘health’, as confirmed by Article 196 which 
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provides explicit direction to policymakers, constraining policy choices and, ultimately, 
the legislative function as a result.59   
The democratic character of the Constitution is mirrored in Brazil’s healthcare 
system which emerged from the Sanitary Reform movement (Movimento Sanitarista) 
of the 1970s and 80s.  Partly as a resistance to dictatorship, the movement, comprising 
an informal coalition of health professionals, academics, and activists, lobbied for a 
universal and constitutionally protected public health system.  Its efforts brought forth 
important health sector reforms which, at least on paper, contrasted with the more 
market based reforms occurring in other jurisdictions in the 1990s.  The resulting public 
Unified Health System (SUS) is declared to be based on the principles of universality, 
equity, public financing, decentralisation, popular participation and integrated service 
provision.   
Ferraz argues that the high level of prescription in the Brazilian constitution, 
rather than establishing an enhanced range of rights and entitlements and ensuring 
that power is bounded, may in fact promote inertia.  From one perspective, he states, 
constitutions “should establish only the abstract principles, and leave the rest for the 
field of ordinary politics”60 because “the more specific a constitution becomes, the 
more it reduces the scope for institutions of state to achieve the constitution’s goals”61 
and, consequently, the harder it is to secure and manage the fit between policy 
initiatives and constitutional guarantees.  It is, therefore, clear that highly specific 
constitutional provisions may undercut the purpose of the constitution itself since, “if 
the legislature and public administration decide … that the detailed constitutional 
provisions are impossible to implement, or cannot be implemented in the near future 
… there is the risk of debasing the constitutional document”62 and, by implication, what 
it establishes, including institutions of state, divisions of power, forms of democracy, 
and important rights.  Where, therefore, da Silva and Terrazas maintain that “in the 
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area of social and economic rights, protection of rights can only mean the real 
implementation of such rights”63 the opposite may, in fact, occur.     
It is probably fair to say that the problem of ‘fit’ in the Brazilian context relates 
to fitting the promise of the constitution to the reality of what politicians are willing, or 
able, to deliver.  The Constitution’s health provisions make high demands of Brazilian 
state institutions, political processes, policy-making and budgets and the promised 
access to, promotion and protection of health has not materialised despite the 
constitutional guarantees.  Alves and Timmins claim that, in reality, a two-tiered 
system persists where “[t]hose with sufficient means have access to a private system 
of healthcare that provides quality treatment on demand, while the remainder of the 
country relies on an overburdened system of public clinics and hospitals.”64  This gap 
between the aspirations of the Constitution and the reality of SUS is one that has 
needed to be plugged through litigation since the constitution’s health provisions 
automatically give rise to court-enforceable rights.65  That enforceability arises on two 
different planes.  The first is that the right to health may be asserted by each and every 
citizen.  The second is that the Constitution obliges the state – the sphere of public 
power in the broadest sense – to promote, protect and defend health.  Ostensibly, 
therefore, when called upon to adjudicate constitutional rights, Brazilian courts cannot 
duck the issue of fit, even if policymakers have done so.   
Ferraz notes an “explosion of litigation”66 in Brazilian courts, in particular in the 
areas of medicine and treatment provision.  The judicialisation of health has 
necessitated Brazilian courts’ involvement in interpreting policy - including the finer 
details - allocating resources and ensuring that state provision complies with 
healthcare’s fundamental principles as set out in the Constitution.  This means that 
explicit constitutional protection for health, whilst attractive in theory, may be argued 
to foster an undesirable level of judicial intrusion into the political arena, especially if, 
                                                          
63 Virgílio Afonso da Silva and Fernanda Vargas Terrazas “Claiming the Right to Health in 
Brazilian Courts: the Exclusion of the Already Excluded” Law and Social Inquiry 36(4) (2011): 
825 
64 “Social Exclusion and the Two-Tiered Healthcare System of Brazil” Inter-American 
Development Bank, Research Network Working Paper R-436, 2001, 5 
65 Augusto Zimmerman “Constitutional Rights in Brazil: A Legal Fiction?”Murdoch University 
E-Law Journal 14(2) (2007) 
66 Ferraz, “Right to Health”, 1 
as Ferraz contends, Brazilian judges have been “not at all deferential to the decisions 
of the political branches about social policy and resource allocation in health.”67   
On the other hand, the judicial role as guardian of the constitution may mandate 
such intrusion and, if seeking fit is both desirable (as we claim) and a constitutionally 
mandated judicial enterprise (as appears to be the case68) it might be viewed as the 
only legitimate and sustainable position for the courts to adopt.  Michelman states that, 
in these circumstances, the judiciary is faced with a “hapless choice between 
usurpation and abdication” which means either that judges must make a “pretentious, 
inexpert, … resented attempt to reshuffle … basic resource-management priorities … 
against prevailing political will” or “debase dangerously the entire currency of rights 
and the rule of law by openly ceding to executive and parliamentary bodies an 
unreviewable privilege of indefinite postponement of a declared constitutional right.”69   
The Brazilian approach draws judges into the political arena by requiring them 
to determine the contours of the Constitution’s right to health and, initially, in the 
Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (BFSC) this engendered a highly proactive 
approach.70  Wang notes the BFSC’s declaration that a lack of resources could not 
restrict the right to health71 and often repeated mantra that the constitution must be: 
  
“completely respected and fully complied with, especially in cases where a right 
– such as the right to health – entails a judicial prerogative to ensure the right 
of the citizen to demand positive action from the State … The judiciary’s action 
in those situations is legitimized where the State refuses to respect the 
constitutional commandment, whether by arbitrary and intolerable default, or by 
any other form of governmental deviant behaviour.”72 
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Despite its apparent determination to ensure healthcare’s fit with the Constitution, the 
BFSC soon concluded that its approach was unsustainable.  Neither it, nor the 
government, was a Sorcerer’s Apprentice: resources could not be created out of thin 
air.  The BFSC’s principled approach to fit had, therefore, to give way to practicalities 
and the recognition of a rather more limited right to health than that detailed in the 
Constitution:  
 
“The fulfilment of social and economic rights depends on financial resources 
that are subject to the government’s available budget …  [O]nce it is objectively 
shown that the State does not have the financial capacity, it cannot be obliged 
to fulfil these constitutional duties.”73 
 
The BFSC’s fluctuating deference to the realities of healthcare provision might 
have suggested that assertions of the right to health at first would always, and 
subsequently would never, prevail but many Article 6 claims have succeeded.74  It 
might also have suggested that, irrespective of a written constitutional guarantee, the 
BFSC had adopted the kind of model that emerged in both the USA and UK, whereby 
the constitution would be fitted to policy rather than vice versa, but that is not the case 
either.  What the BFSC opted for was an approach mediated via public consultation, 
echoing both the drafting of the Constitution and the creation of SUS.  In 2009, the 
BFSC held a public hearing to invite opinion, information and input from laymen and 
experts, to discuss access to health care and to consider the judicialisation of the right 
to health.  In subsequent case law, this democratic glossing of the BFSC’s involvement 
in policy determinations and striving for fit resulted in a set of guidelines and criteria 
for a “refined and realistic interpretation”75 of the right to health.  The approach is 
clearly premised on rationing and, in practice, falls woefully short of the Constitution’s 
promise but it does, at least, constitute judicial acknowledgement of the need to 
consider, openly and explicitly, apparent departures from constitutional fit.   
5. Conclusion 
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In the context of healthcare reform, it is apparent that maintaining constitutional fidelity 
is difficult.  What is clear is that the unstoppable force of healthcare policy does not, in 
fact, meet the immovable object of the constitution, as might be imagined, but, instead, 
encounters something altogether more malleable.  In the USA and Brazil respectively, 
the judiciary proved instrumental in fitting and bending the constitution to healthcare, 
rather than the other way round, whereas, in the UK, alerting Parliament to 
healthcare’s uncomfortable constitutional fit was a matter of pre-legislative scrutiny 
undertaken by members of the legislature.  In all three jurisdictions, on the basis of 
economic necessity, healthcare reforms ultimately trumped prevailing constitutional 
norms.  In no instance was constitutional fidelity fully maintained.  That might be a 
concern for those who exhibit a preference for principled, as opposed to practical, fit. 
